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Introduction
Legal Standards of Proof
Medicine, like law, is a pragmatic, probabilistic activity. Both
require that decisions be made on the basis of available evidence,
within a limited time.
In contrast to law, medicine, particularly evidence-based
medicine as it is currently practiced, aspires to a scientific standard
of proof, one that is more certain than the standards of proof courts
apply in civil and criminal proceedings.
But medicine, as Dr. William Osler put it, is an art of
probabilities, or at best, a science of uncertainty. One can better
practice medicine by using other evidentiary standards in addition
to the scientific. To employ only the scientific standard of proof is
inappropriate, if not impossible; furthermore, as this review will
show, its application in medicine is fraught with bias.
Evidence is information. It supports or undermines a
proposition, whether a hypothesis in science, a diagnosis in
medicine, or a fact or point in question in a legal investigation. In
medicine, physicians marshal evidence to make decisions on how
to best prevent, diagnose, and treat disease, and improve health. In
law, courts decide the facts and render justice. Judges and juries
assess evidence to establish liability, to settle custody and medical
issues, and to determine a defendants guilt or innocence.
Law applies well-defined evidentiary standards. In British and
U.S. common law systems, differential standards of proof are set
according to the consequences of the decision, with life and liberty
prized most highly. Legal standards of proof range from the lowest,
the Precautionary Principle, to the criminal standard (see Table 1).
In 38 States, the highest, criminal legal standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt can result in the defendant being put to death.
Where criminal penalties are not in issue, courts resolve disputes
at a lower standard. Civil cases that follow an evidentiary standard
of more likely than not require only that the balance of
probability be greater than 50 percent to support, or undermine, a
disputed proposition.
U.S. courts, unlike those of the UK at present, use a higher civil
standard of clear and convincing. This standard is applied when
settling disputes involving child custody, involuntary commitment,
withdrawal of life support in comatose patients, and determination
of a punishable frame of mind driven by malice, oppression, or
fraud. It is also used in some administrative disciplinary
proceedings for attorneys, medical professionals, and other cases.
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The Scientific Standard of Proof
The Precautionary Principle
Science prizes objective certainty. For a hypothesis to be
proved, or a theory to become theorem, the evidence supporting it
must be irrefutable. But science does not uniformly adhere to this
standard. Subjective opinions and consensus among scientists
often supersede the stricture of irrefutability.
Hence, scientific standards of proof are not uniform and well
defined, in contrast to legal standards. Standards of
measurement, ways of reporting and evaluating results, and
particular types of experimental practices vary. As a result, there
is no simple and reducible algorithm against which good
science can be evaluated.
There is another aspect of the scientific standard of proof that
particularly impacts medicine. Sciences quest for objective
certainty admits only a narrow range of evidence.
The Precautionary Principle is derived from the 1990 Bergen
Declaration, which states, Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be
used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental
degradation.
As currently practiced, governments implement policies and
regulations based on what might cause harm, even if there is little
or no evidence that a hazard exists. This principle increasingly
governs state regulatory policy and international environmental
law; and regulators employ it to ban DDT, reduce supposedly
harmful CO emissions, and bar planting of genetically engineered
crops. It is broadly analogous to probable cause, and thus a lower
standard than for a prima facie case. In the European Union, under
this standard a decision is taken on the available evidence: the
real risk alleged for public health appears sufficiently established
on the basis of the latest scientific data available.
Like requiring medical evidence to meet a scientific standard of
proof, rendering regulatory decisions based on the Precautionary
Principle, without requiring any evidence on their risk and benefits,
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must be questioned. The benefits achieved from having banned
DDT are disputed; and, not having access to this pesticide, 50
million people have died from DDT-preventable malaria.
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) promotes the use of
current best evidence in making decisions about the care of
individual patients. Only well-designed, randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) produce medical evidence that can meet the scientific
standard of proof. Systematic reviews (meta-analyses) of
multiple RCTs are even better. Meta-analyses are the gold
standard of scientific medical evidence, and EBM proponents put
them at the top of the EBM evidence pyramid.
Investigators have carried out seven randomized controlled
trials on transmyocardial laser revascularization (TMR). In this
procedure the surgeon burns 1-mm full-thickness holes through the
heart muscle with a laser, 1 cm apart in a line from the base to the
apex, and then in other lines 1 cm from each other, for a total of 20 to
40 channels. These channels and the capillaries that grow out from
them provide a way for blood being pumped out of the left ventricle
to nourish the myocardium. The channels seal over on the
epicardial side and mimic the sinusoids in a reptiles heart, which
has no coronary arteries.
These RCTs prove beyond a reasonable doubt, if not irrefutably,
that TMR relieves angina, improves myocardial perfusion, and
reduces the need for subsequent angina-related hospitalizations.
Accordingly, ACC/AHA guidelines now recommend TMR as a
Class IIA therapy for intractable angina, which means the
weight of evidence is in favor of usefulness/efficacy, with a
Level of Evidence: A, i.e., data derived from multiple
randomized clinical trials.
These ACC/AHA guidelines apply to the average patient in the
population with intractable angina. Medicine endeavors to make
decisions for individual patients in the context of population-based
information like this. Data from these TMR trials do not provide
information the surgeon needs to treat a specific patient. Some
patients with small coronary arteries might benefit from TMR done
in conjunction with coronary bypass surgery, since graft patency
rates are low in these patients. The operative mortality for TMR is
higher in patients with poor ventricular function. Should the
surgeon use an intra-aortic balloon pump in these patients? These
trials do not provide answers to treatment questions like this.
With regard toAlzheimers disease, Saver and Kalafut calculate
that 127 RCTs would have to be done in 63,500 patients over a 286-
year period to determine the optimal combination of agents to treat
this disease.
Systematic reviews combine trials that address similar
questions, like whether albumin or crystalloid is better for volume
expansion, in order to achieve a statistically more certain
conclusion. The Cochrane Injuries Group Albumin Reviewers in
Britain performed a meta-analysis in 1998 of 30 RCTs on volume
replacement in critically ill trauma victims, and they found that the
risk of death was 6 percent higher in patients given albumin rather
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Randomized Controlled Trials
Meta-Analyses
than crystalloid. It is notable that none of the studys seven
analysts had experience working in an intensive care unit.
When the study was published, the (London) reported
that it suggests that up to 30,000 patients in Britain alone have died
because they were treated with human albumin solution. The
director of the Cochrane Centre in Oxford said that he would sue
any doctor who gave him an infusion of albumin and that patients
should seek redress in the courts for clinical negligence if the
guidelines based on this analysis were transgressed.
Another systematic review on this subject, published in 2001,
analyzed 55 RCTs, including ones that had a lower mortality with
albumin that the first meta-analysis left out. This 2001 study
concluded that albumin has no adverse effect on mortality.
Analysts employ statistical techniques in their systematic
reviews that include a numerical scale for weighting the quality of
each trial. Juni and colleagues show how analysts can obtain
diametrically opposing results depending on which of the more
than 25 scales they use to distinguish between high- and low-
quality RCTs.
Another source of bias is the studys sponsor. The UKs
National Health Service (NHS), which stocks albumin and
crystalloid in its hospitals, funded the 1998 albumin meta-analysis.
Albumin is 30 times more expensive than crystalloid, and the
studys sponsor would save a lot of money if it only had to purchase
crystalloid. Other meta-analyses suffer similar flaws, such as a
recently published one claiming that high-dose vitamin E
supplements increase mortality. Critics have exposed the
methodological flaws in this study.
Randomized trials provide epidemiologic evidence framed in
terms of statistical significance. Epidemiology examines the
incidence of disease and the effects of therapeutic interventions at the
population level. It cannot answer the question of whether causes
in a specific individual. The U.S. Federal Judicial Centers
states: Epidemiologydoes not
address the question of the cause of an individuals disease. This
question[of]specific causation is beyond the domain of the
science of epidemiology. [It] addresses whether an agent can cause
a disease, not whether an agent did cause a specific disease
Epidemiology can show that an association exists between the
agent in question and a given toxicity or disease, at the population
level. Epidemiologic evidence cannot establish a causal association
unless other biological evidence backs it up. The Bradford Hill
criteria spell out what that evidence needs to be. Regardless of
these criteria, some U.S. courts will admit epidemiology as
evidence justifying an inference of causation in toxic tort litigation
on a balance of probability when the relative risk is shown to
exceed 2.0. U.S. courts also admit studies with a lower relative risk
while recognizing that such studies may be insufficient proof of
specific causation.
Evidence from epidemiologic RCTs does not necessarily meet a
scientific standard of proof. Indeed, biases in methodology can
generate evidence that does not even meet the lowest legal-civil
standard of proof. These include faulty trial protocols, reporting
outcomes in terms of relative risk without giving absolute risk of all-
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cause deaths, and justifying interventions on surrogate outcomes
(e.g., cholesterol level) when the primary outcome (freedom from
myocardial infarction and survival) is not improved.
The investigators interpretation of the trials results is especially
prone to bias. And, as seen in the NHS albumin meta-analysis, a
studys source of funding can affect its results. Als-Nielson and
colleagues found that RCTs funded by pharmaceutical companies
are significantly more likely to recommend the experimental drug as
the treatment of choice than are studies funded by organizations that
have no financial stake in the outcome.
Chan and Altman reviewed 519 RCTs that were published in
December 2000 and indexed in PubMed. They found that
incomplete reporting of outcomes (described in the methods
section but not in the results section) was common, and conclude
that the medical literature of randomized trials represents a
selective and biased subset of study outcomes. As one observer
put it, Epidemiological analysis is notoriously susceptible to
misinterpretation, and even manipulation. Two sets of researchers
can extract diametrically opposed results from the same data.
The pharmaceutical and biotech industries now fund more than 60
percent of the RCTs that medical journals publish, which raises the
concern that supposedly objective science is being turned into a
marketing tool.
EBM protagonists place case reports near the bottom of the
medical evidence pyramid alongside editorials and opinions. They
call this eyewitness-like testimony anecdotal. Nevertheless, like
witness testimony in the courtroom, the most essential evidence in
medicine is the patients story.
In a court of law, eyewitness testimony is often the primary
source of information that the court must use to reach a verdict.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys cross-examine witnesses to
plumb the evidentiary reliability of their testimony and introduce,
when available, more scientific, hard evidence, such as DNAhair
analysis, that can corroborate it.
Most medical evidence does not meet the scientific standard of
proof; and, as in law, it should be judged by a standard of proof
appropriate to the fact or point in question. An anecdotal case
report can provide evidence of probative value, just like eyewitness
testimony in a murder trial.And it can be similarly tested, by second
opinions, re-examination, laboratory tests, and follow-up.
A single case report can prove that a drug causes an adverse
reaction. Three events related to administration of the drug prove
specific causation: 1) the reaction occurs after the drug
is given; 2) it resolves when the drug is
discontinued; and 3) the adverse event recurs when
the drug is given a second time. Causation is judged to be certain
owing to this double hit of challenge and re-challenge.
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
pharmaceutical companies acknowledge that just one
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de-challenge
re-challenge
challenge/de-challenge/re-challenge (CDR) case proves
causality. The FDA states, Even a single well-documented case
report can be viewed as a signal [of causation], particularly if the
report describes a positive re-challenge. In another report, the
FDA notes that determining causality includes assessment of
temporal relationships [and] de-challenge/re-challenge
informationwhich is usually considered your strongest evidence
of a causal association. And as
puts it, a positive re-challenge is
probably the strongest proof of a causal relationship. If giving
the drug a second time is not done, owing to ethical considerations,
three cases of challenge/de-challenge (CD) can prove causality.
Heparin causes thrombocytopenia in a small percentage of
patients (2-3 percent). In one patient, after a 10-day course of
heparin the platelet count dropped from 200,000/mm to 60,000.
Over the next 20 days, off heparin, it returned to normal (179,000).
Asecond bolus of heparin was then given, which promptly dropped
the platelet count to 49,000. No other causes for thrombocytopenia
were evident, and the presence of heparin/platelet factor 4
antibodies provides biologic plausibility on how heparin can cause
this adverse effect. This single case proves that heparin causes
life-threatening thrombocytopenia in some people. Likewise, one
CDR case of suicide ideation after taking flouxetine (Prozac) is
sufficient to prove that the drug causes this reaction.
With regard to drugs and vaccines, the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
acknowledges that [t]he recurrence or nonrecurrence of the adverse
event will often have a major impact on the causality assessment.
The judiciary follows well-developed rules on admissibility of
evidence. Hearsay evidence is not admissible (except for civil cases
in the UK and certain well-defined areas such as business records in
criminal cases) nor is opinion evidence (except for expert opinion
on technical and scientific matters). Similar fact evidence is
normally inadmissible in English law criminal proceedings unless
its value as proof outweighs its prejudicial effect. In the
case, the defendant, George Smith, was accused of
drowning his bride in the bathtub. No physical evidence
implicated him in her death, but she had signed over her estate to
him on their betrothal.
Evidence was admitted at trial that this person, using different
names, had married two other women who also drowned in their
bathtubs. They too had made financial arrangements from which he
would benefit. This evidence was strong proof that outweighed its
prejudicial effect. It was sufficient to find Smith guilty as charged,
and he was executed in 1915.
This early English law example shows that similar fact
evidence is analogous to challenge/de-challenge/re-challenge
evidence in medicine. Both are capable of demonstrating causality
to the highest standards of proof. In , their deaths
precluded a de-challenge, but such evidence is essentially the same
as three CD cases in proving causation. This also demonstrates that
the plausibility of a single case report can be reinforced by each
subsequent report, whereby a case series taken together can
provide a substantially higher degree of proof than each report
taken individually or isolated spontaneous reports of adverse
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events. One such case series is that of Wakefield et al., which shows
a possible association of autistic regression, intestinal complaints,
and ileal lymphoid-nodular hyperplasia following MMR
vaccination in 12 children.
An epidemic of autism afflicts children today. Fifty years ago
fewer than one in 10,000 children had this devastating malady, but
today, with a prevalence of one in 166, one in every 68 American
families has an autistic child. A number of parents with autistic
children and some investigators believe that the measles-mumps-
rubella (MMR) vaccine and/or vaccines that contain thimerosal,
especially in combination, can cause autism. Indeed, the director of
the Autism Research Institute states, Thousands of parents
reportand demonstrate with home videosthat their children
were normal and responsive until suffering an adverse vaccine
reaction.
Medical practitioners first inject the MMR vaccine into
American children at age 12-15 months, and then a second time
when they are ages 4 to 6. Injecting two widely separated doses of
this vaccine constitutes a challenge/de-challenge/re-challenge in
susceptible children. A valid way to test the hypothesis that MMR
vaccine causes autism is to adopt the methodology that the FDAand
pharmaceutical companies use to show that a particular drug causes
an adverse reactiona CDR case report or CD case series. One
well documented case of a normally developing child who becomes
autistic after being given the MMR vaccine, improves with therapy,
and then regresses following the second dose (re-challenge) would
be strong proof that this hypothesis is true.
Public health officials and their respective medical
establishments in the United States and United Kingdom will not
accept this kind of evidence with regard to vaccines, stating: The
weight of currently available scientific evidence does not support
the hypothesis that vaccines cause autism. For them, only
epidemiologic evidence is sufficiently scientific. But
epidemiologic evidence, as an application of statistics, is open to
manipulation and bias. Since it does not meet the scientific standard
of irrefutability, it is not per se scientific.
The chairman of the IOM Committee on Immunization Safety
Review acknowledges that [the Committee] does not exclude the
possibility that MMR vaccine could in rare cases contribute to
autistic spectrum disorders  because epidemiological evidence
lacks the precision to assess rare occurrence and the proposed
biological models, although far from established, are nevertheless
not disproved.
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Clinical
importance is not equivalent to statistical significance. With rare
and uncommonly occurring diseases, a nonsignificant finding in a
randomized trial does not necessarily mean that there is no causal
association between the agent in question and the disease. Such
trials are subject to a false-negative Type II error, which incorrectly
supports the null hypothesis that agent does not cause disease
In a legal case, lawyers organize the evidence they obtain to
create a factual matrix. Elements of information are corroborated
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and cross-correlated to present a consistent, linked set of facts. Law
tests the reliability of the sources of information, in addition to
testing the information the sources supply. It admits evidence from
a broad range of sources, which include human witnesses,
documents, and machine witnesses (material on computers,
audio, and video).
Courts tend to exclude information, like hearsay evidence, if the
court lacks the means to test its reliability. Medical evidence is the
same. It begins with admitting (of necessity) the patients oral
account. Labeling witness testimony anecdotal does not render it
inherently unreliable. Oral or eyewitness evidence and anecdote
are not synonymous. Eyewitness evidence can be tested
In a medical case, physicians also marshal evidence from a
variety of sources to create a factual matrix. They include, in addition
to statistical epidemiologic evidence, case reports, case series, their
own clinical experience and judgment, the opinions of others. And
medicine, like law, has various means for testing and assessing
evidence, which include reproducibility and predictability in
addition to statistical significance. Medical evidence spans the
gamut of proof, from more likely than not to irrefutable.
In writing evidence-based testing and treatment guidelines,
EBM advocates make recommendations based only on evidence
obtained from controlled trials and meta-analyses. Considered
best practices, such guidelines are now used by government
agencies, third-party payers, and managed care organizations to
decide coverage and track physicians quality of care. But the
factual matrix in each patient, which includes genetic and
biologic variations and coexisting diseases, renders application
of these epidemiologically based guidelines problematic. There
are often special circumstances in a particular patient, described
by Welsby as Type 3 complexity, that guidelines do not
address. The commonality of medical and legal evidence helps
expose the inherent flaw in these EBM two-dimensional,
reductionist flowcharts.
In scientific and technical matters, judges and juries rely on the
testimony of individual experts. The U.S. legal system has rules of
evidence that regulate the admission of such testimony. But these
rules of evidence do not question or regulate the rules, methods,
procedures, and evidence generally accepted in medicine. Expert
testimony based on flawed medical evidentiary practices will
continue to fail courts and litigants and result in unreliable and
unjust court decisions.
U.S. courts always have had power to exclude or admit
medical, scientific, or other technical evidence. In 1923 the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals laid down a general acceptance test for
the admission of novel scientific opinion testimony in
, which stated: The thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs. The
Court affirmed the trial judges refusal to admit evidence of the
results of a systolic blood pressure deception test (a predecessor
to the polygraph).
Following the 1975 enactment of new Federal Rules of
Evidence, and particularly Rule 702 dealing with scientific
evidence, in 1993 the U.S. Supreme Court, in
.
Dealing with
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, for the first time obliged federal
judges to be proactive and screen the medical scientific evidence of
individual experts in toxic tort litigation to ensure it is relevant and
reliable. makes judges gatekeepers of medical/
scientific expert testimony measured against the benchmarks of
existing knowledge and practice.
A judge must now ascertain whether scientific evidence is
grounded in the methods and procedures of science. The Court
emphasized that the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is...a flexible
one. It then identified four factors to consider when assessing
whether a theory or technique is derived scientifically. These
include its methodology, testability, subjection to peer review, and
general acceptance by the scientific community.
In practice, is vulnerable to manifold corruptions
resulting in relevant reliable evidence being systematically
excluded in favor of the less reliable. rules do not correct
erroneous theories that have become accepted medical thinking,
including theories about what evidence is reliable. Editors can
subvert peer review by selecting only reviewers who will reject
papers that run counter toor praise papers that supportthe
interests of journals advertisers or its owners. Lines of independent
research contradicting conventional wisdom can systemically
remain unpublished.
Such hard-to-publish research may prove that what the
scientific community generally accepts as correct is, in fact, wrong.
Research follows the funding, resulting in a wealth of publications
favoring the funding interests. This can have a disproportionate
effect on the weight of evidence, especially for epidemiologic
evidence in court.
According to some leading trial lawyers, plaintiffs now have to
demonstrate near certainty before a court will allow a novel
scientific theory to prevail (Waters CAof Waters & Kraus, personal
communication, 2004). Following the lead of evidence-based
medicine, U.S. courts place a premium on epidemiologic data.
Before a U.S. judge will allow the plaintiff to prove specific
causation, epidemiologic evidence that a causal association exists
between the agent in question and a given toxicity or disease must
normally be presented first. The
states: [A]n agent cannot be considered to cause the
illness of a specific person unless it is recognized as a cause of that
disease in general. After jumping this hurdle, the judge will
then admit other medical evidence for proving specific causation,
such as CDR case reports and CD case series, pharmacological
research on mechanisms of toxicity, and animal and tissue
studies. In U.S. federal courts and in an increasing number of state
courts that have adopted , this epidemiologic prerequisite
has blocked litigation on harm done by mercury amalgams,
thimerosal, and MMR vaccine.
With regard to uncommonly occurring and rare events like
adverse drug reactions and vaccine-induced autism, judges need to
realize that a CDR case report and CD case series alone can prove
causation to a very high standard. Courts will be informed of
apposite evidence of this kind if, and only if, evidence in medicine
and medical science does the informing.
Moreover, aside, for this to happen, medicine needs to
develop a better understanding of the nature of evidence and of
evidentiary proof, by emulating laws approach to evidence. Law in
turn needs a better understanding of the shortcomings of medicines
current approach to evidence.
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